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Abstract
This paper empirically analyzes the change in the quality of parallel import goods (goods that
are traded without the permission of the intellectual property right holder) across countries
over time. Index number methodology for assessing the changes in quality of traded goods is
applied to goods subject to parallel import competition in the European Union during
1995-2004. The claim that parallel import competition leads to a reduction in quality over
time is not substantiated after analyzing the changes in the quality of imports to Sweden and
Finland (who joined the EU in 1995 and subsequently opened their markets to parallel trade)
and comparing them to changes in quality in the rest of the EU.
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Parallel imports are authentic goods that are protected by patent, copyright, or trademark but are 
traded without the authorization of the intellectual property right holder.  They are branded 
consumer products such as clothing, pharmaceuticals, or electronics and are legitimate goods, 
not knockoffs or counterfeits.  Countries differ in their treatment of the exhaustion of intellectual 
property rights and so some allow parallel trade (e.g. among nations of the European Union) and 
others do not (e.g. the United States).  The policy of permitting parallel imports is often pursued 
in order to lower prices (through competition) for consumers. 
 
One of the arguments against permitting parallel imports (PIs) is that manufacturers may have 
diminished incentive to keep up the quality of their product when faced with competition from 
their own product.
1Manufacturers must bear investment and marketing costs as well as provide 
pre- and post-sales services.  PI firms engage in arbitrage between markets and can free ride on 
such services while still selling the authentic product.  Consumers are indifferent (except for any 
price difference) between buying from a PI firm and an authorized distributor since the good is 
authentic.  Thus, the manufacturer faces competition from its own product.  If the manufacturer 
can no longer command a premium on price, incentive to maintain high quality may diminish. 
 
Quality can be defined as an additional characteristic that is valued by buyers (Aiginger 2001).  
For example, quality can encompass such things as durability, flexibility in use, a sophisticated 
variant, or user specificity.  There could also be a service component or information content.  
High quality generally allows for a higher price without losing sales.  
  
Studying PI goods is important from a policy standpoint because in permitting PIs, a potential 
tradeoff between low prices and high quality could result.  Since the European Union allows 
parallel trade, an analysis of PI goods traded there could lend some insight to the validity of the 
existence of such a tradeoff. Using existing methodology for inferring the quality of traded 
goods, I analyze the change in the quality of goods subject to PI competition traded within the 
European Union over the period 1995-2004.  A comparison is made between the countries which 
joined the EU in 1995 (Finland and Sweden) and the other EU countries.  However, the claim 
that PI competition reduces quality is not substantiated.  
 
2. Motivation and Literature 
The body of literature on parallel imports is still relatively small. Malueg and Schwartz (1994), 
Maskus and Chen (2004), and Chard and Mellor (1989) all discuss theoretical reasons for and 
consequences of the existence of PIs. Empirical analyses of these goods are extremely sparse.  
Notable examples are Ganslandt and Maskus (2004) who look at pharmaceuticals, and Maskus 
and Chen (2004) who test their vertical price control model with US trade data. 
 
The quality of traded goods has also been explored in the economic literature.  Quality and trade 
patterns have been examined both theoretically (Flam and Helpman 1987) and empirically 
(Hallak 2006 and Hummels & Klenow 2005).  Quality variation over time and across countries 
has also been assessed (Aw & Roberts 1986 and Feenstra 1988). Additionally, some studies look 
at the quality of factor inputs to gauge the quality of goods (Aiginger 2001).  
  
                                                 
1 See Chard and Mellor (1989). 2 
 
PI goods are unique in the sense that they are authentic, trademarked items that compete against 
goods with the same trademark.
2  Consumers do not have to worry about quality difference 
between authorized dealers and parallel traders because by definition PI goods are legitimate and 
not counterfeits.  In theory their quality should not differ across countries; low income countries 
should export the same quality PI goods as high income countries.  Consider a producer in 
France who exports a bottle of wine to Greece.  If a PI firm re-exports that bottle to Germany, it 
should still be of the same quality because it is still the original good.  Thus, Greece’s exports of 
PI goods should have the same quality as that of a higher-income country.  
  
Like other products, the quality of goods subject to PI competition can change over time. But 
how could PI competition be the cause of a reduction in quality?  It is straightforward to see how 
competition from counterfeits could result in a “market for lemons” in which the manufacturer 
ultimately produces a lower-quality good.
3  However, since PI goods are authentic, they are of 
the same quality as any other item bearing the manufacturer’s trademark. Consumers will not 
perceive PIs to be of a lower quality since they believe (correctly) that the goods are authentic.  
Predictions from the literature on reputations as a signal of quality can be extended to PI goods 
to explain why quality may be lower as a result of PI competition.   
 
In Shapiro (1982), firms signal quality by way of reputation.
4 Assume firms can choose the 
quality of the good produced and higher quality is associated with higher production costs.  
Ultimately, the incentive for a firm to produce a good with higher quality depends on the ability 
of consumers to recognize the higher quality. If consumers cannot learn, and therefore continue 
to buy from a firm with a low-quality, then there is no incentive to produce more than the 
minimum quality needed to maintain a firm’s reputation.   
 
For PI goods, a consumer is unable to distinguish between the parallel import and the “original” 
good.  The authorized dealer’s good and the parallel import are of identical quality so the 
consumer is indifferent (except for price) to purchasing from the parallel trader or from an 
authorized dealer.  By extending Shapiro’s results to PI goods it is expected that if PI 
competition were to commence, customers will not recognize the authorized dealer so the 
manufacturer has no incentive to produce more than the minimum quality needed to maintain the 
firm’s reputation.   
 
To determine whether the quality of traded PI goods has changed over time, first quality will 
have to be quantified.  Several works use unit values to infer quality. One approach is to use the 
unit value itself as a measure of quality.  For example, in Hallak (2006), price indexes are 
constructed using export unit values and any cross-country variations in the price indexes are 
attributed to variations in quality.
5 Hummels and Klenow (2005) infer the quality of a nation’s 
exports by combining estimates from regressions of export unit values and quantities on a 
measure of exporter income with elasticities of substitution.  The use of index numbers as in Aw 
and Roberts (1986) is a third option for inferring quality change from unit values.
6 A hedonic 
                                                 
2 They could also be items that are patented or copyrighted. 
3 See Akerlof (1970) for a description of the “market for lemons”.  
4 Smallwood and Conlisk (1979), Rogerson (1983), and Allen (1984) also investigate reputation and quality.  
5 Rodrik (1988) also uses unit values as a proxy for quality. 
6 Index numbers have also been used to assess quality in Boornstein and Feenstra (1987). 3 
 
specification with unit values regressed on specific product characteristics is used by Feenstra 
(1988). An instrumental variables approach is completed by Bils and Klenow (2001).   
 
This paper contributes to both the limited literature on PIs in general, and to the quality literature 
in the capacity that changes in the quality of PI goods over time has not previously been 
assessed.  Contributing to the policy dialog, the argument that PI competition reduces quality is 
investigated. This initial analysis will make use of existing methodology for inferring quality 
change using unit values.      
 
3. Analysis of the Quality of Parallel Import Goods 
One of the arguments against allowing parallel trade is that there could be a reduction in quality 
over time as a manufacturer faces competition from its own brand. Finland and Sweden joined 
the EU in 1995 and subsequently opened up their markets to parallel trade.  Since parallel trade 
competition was already taking place in the rest of the EU and (presumably) the quality decline 
due to PI competition would have already taken place, then a natural experiment arises with the 
accession of Sweden and Finland.  If there is validity to the claim that PI competition results in 
lower quality, these two countries should have a reduction in import quality relative to the other 
EU countries.  
 
The following criteria will need to be met to determine that PI competition in Sweden and 
Finland resulted in lower import quality: 
- Sweden and Finland have lower import quality in the years after their accession. 
- If other EU countries also have lower quality in the years after Sweden and Finland  
joined the union, then the reduction in quality in the accession countries is larger. 
- The import quality of goods not subject to PI competition is not lower. 
In other words, to verify that PI competition is the driver of lower quality, first, lower quality 
must be evidenced.
7  Then, the lower quality should be of a greater amount than any reduction in 
countries that have had PI competition for a longer period of time.  Finally, a reduction in quality 
should not be part of a broader trend of lower import quality for goods in general.   
 
To examine the quality of PI goods over time, Aw and Roberts (1986) index number 
methodology is used.
8  They propose that changes in an aggregate unit value index can be 
decomposed into the changes attributable to quality and pure (quality adjusted) prices. The 
change in an aggregate unit value index is a biased measure of the true change in prices. 
Observed prices may be increasing due to an increase in quality.  This bias can be removed by 
using a Tornqvist price index, which will reflect the quality-adjusted import price.
9   
 
The difference between the change in the aggregate unit value index and a Tornqvist index yields  
a measure of the change in import quality due to changing the composition of the bundle.  In 
other words, changes in the observed price index are separated into changes in pure prices and 
                                                 
7 Of course, PI competition was not the only policy change that occurred when the countries joined the EU.  It is 
possible that implementing some of the other EU trade regulations could influence the quality as well.   
8 While the most common measure of quality is to simply use unit values, I will submit to the proposition in Hallak 
and Schott (2008) that when goods are differentiated, then unit values will not solely capture quality.  Therefore, I 
will use the index number methodology to try to measure quality changes.    
9 It is the discrete time version of a Divisia price index which is a weighted sum of the growth rates of individual 
product prices. 4 
 
changes in quality.  Changes in the observed prices could come from changes in pure prices or 
from changes in quality. The changes in pure prices could come from many factors (e.g. 
production cost reductions).  
 
This technique is applied to goods subject to PI competition that are traded in the EU-15 over the 
period 1995 - 2004.
10  Analysis reveals that both Finland and Sweden had higher quality in the 
period immediately after accession. So did eight of the other EU nations. Halfway through the 
sample (2000), the accession nations each had a higher level of quality than they did at the 
beginning of the sample. When comparing the quality change in Sweden and Finland with the 
rest of the EU, there is not sufficient support for the claim that PI competition reduces quality.   
 
3.1 Methodology 
Following Aw and Roberts, construct an aggregate unit value index for each importer j, 
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where g is a good, c is an importer country, V is the export value, X is the import quantity, and t 
is the year.   The growth rate in the aggregate unit value index is    
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Next, construct a Tornqvist price index. This index is the value-share weighted sum of the 
growth of the individual product prices, 
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This index is a measure of the change in pure prices. The difference between the aggregate unit 
value index of observed prices and the Tornqvist index yields the quality change ΔQj(t) due to 
the change in the composition of the import bundle, 
     
Tornqvist
j j j t P t P t Q ) ( ) ( ) (      .              (4) 
 
This change in quality can be further decomposed into the effect of changing the mix of 
countries that j imports from as well as the effect of changing the mix of goods that j imports. 
The Tornqvist partial price index for some characteristic z is the share-weighted growth in the 
unit value index for that characteristic. That is,  
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and e,d = g, c.  The change in quality stemming from a change in characteristic z can be 
expressed as  
      ) ( ) ( ) (
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where z = g, c.   ) (t Q
g
j   measures the effect of changing the mix of products and   ) (t Q
c
j 
measures the effect of changing the mix of export sources. If the two effects are happening 
concurrently, the change in quality could be overstated so an interaction term is defined to 
counteract such an effect, 
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Finally, the change in observed prices can be expressed as 
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For this analysis, the  ) (t Q
g
j   term will show whether a country has experienced a reduction in 
the quality of imported goods.  
 
3.2  Data 
Parallel trade is not permitted in every country. The European Union does permit parallel trade 
between member states so there is an opportunity to assess PI quality using data from this region. 
However, actual data on parallel trade are not collected by customs.  While at first blush this 
would seem to be a large limitation, analysis using this data can be justified.  The mere threat of 
PI competition may be enough to induce the original manufacturer of a good to modify pricing 
decisions.  The firm may deter PI competition by pricing in such a way that no PI firms actually 
enter the market.  In this case, even if PI data were collected by customs, the value and quantities 
of PI trade would be zero.  Thus, it is appropriate to conduct the analysis using goods that are 
likely subject to PI competition.   
 
A 1999 study by The National Economic Research Associates in the EU indicates that the 
following categories of products are likely subject to parallel trade:  cocoa, sugar confectionary, 
ice cream, alcohol, soft drinks, mineral waters, clothing, footwear, CDs, videodisks, soap, 
perfume, detergent, toiletries, consumer appliances, and consumer electronics.
11  These 
categories encompass 566 (8-digit HS) products in Eurostat’s online trade database, Comext.
12  
                                                 
11 The NERA study used market research to provide a basis for estimating how interested parties might respond to a 
change in the trademark exhaustion regime.  It focused on ten consumer goods sectors, which were mainly chosen 
on the basis of the importance of trademarks in the sector.   
12 This database can be accessed at “http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/newxtweb/”.  Data begin in the year 1995. 6 
 
While eight digits is the most disaggregated level of data available from Comext, keep in mind it 
is still an aggregation.  For example, the 8-digit code 33051000 indicates “shampoos”.  While 
“shampoos” will be treated as a single product in the analysis, in reality there is a substantial 
variety of branded products within that 8-digit product code.  The analysis therefore will not be 
comparing exactly homogenous products.  Since the ultimate aim of this study is to see if the 
quality of PI goods in general varies over time, the heterogeneity within 8-digit product codes 
should not be a large issue.    
 
Data on the 566 product categories are extracted for the following nations: Austria, Belgium, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and 
the United Kingdom. After extraction, 515 products have data entries. Data are annual over the 
period 1995-2004. Observations for each product include the source country, destination country, 
quantity (per 100 kilograms) imported, and import value in euros.  Import values are reported to 
include charges for freight and insurance. There is no indication that transport costs changed 
substantially at the time of the EU enlargement so such costs should not be distorting the 
analysis.         
 
3.3  Analysis 
For the goods subject to PI competition, observed price indexes are computed and first-
differenced according to equations (1) and (2).  Then the decomposition into the change in pure 
prices and the change in quality is made using equations (3) and (4). The quality decomposition 
is calculated according to equations (5) through (8). Tables 1, 2, and 3 contain (respectively) the 
changes in observed prices, pure prices, and product quality for each country treated as an 
importer. 
 
Observed prices changed by varying degrees for each importer.  For example, in the first period, 
prices in Austria, Germany, and Greece fell an average of 5.8% while prices rose in the other 
non-accession countries an average of 8.8%.  Both Finland and Sweden also had higher observed 
prices in the first period.  By the end of the sample, observed prices were lower than 1995 levels 
in Austria, Germany, and Greece.  Prices were higher overall in the remaining nations. 
 
The change in observed prices is decomposed into the change in quality and the change in pure 
(quality-adjusted) prices. Again, countries’ import prices varied.  For the non-accession nations, 
in the first period pure prices rose an average of 4.1% in Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, 
Italy, Portugal, and the UK.  Prices fell an average of 2.8% in the other non-accession countries 
during the same period.  In the same period import prices in Finland fell by 1.2% and in Sweden 
rose by 7.6%.    
 
Focusing on the change in quality for Finland and Sweden, we see that both experienced an 
increase in quality in the two periods immediately after accession. This would not indicate 
support for the conjecture that parallel trade competition lowers quality. However, it is possible 
that the reduction in quality presents after a lag.  In the 1997-1998 period, Finland experiences a 
0.3% decrease in quality while Sweden has a 2.4% increase. In the next period, both nations have 
an increase in quality.  Halfway through the sample (2000), the accession nations each have a 
higher level of quality than in 1995. If parallel trade competition does result in lower quality, it 
does so with a lag longer than five years. In the remaining four periods, each country has more 7 
 
volatility with respect to quality change.  By the end of 2004, the quality of imports in Finland is 
higher than in 1995. However, in Sweden, the overall quality is lower.  In the last four periods, 
there was a 7.4% decrease, an 18.8% decrease, then a 13.1% increase, and finally a 25.1% 
decrease.  It is conceivable that after a lag Sweden experienced lower quality as a result of 
parallel trade competition. 
 
How does the experience of the accession nations compare with that of the other EU nations? In 
the year after accession, some of the nations experienced a reduction in quality (Austria, France, 
Ireland, and Italy), while the other eight countries had an increase in quality. The average 
increase for those countries was 8.5% while Sweden and Finland only experienced increases of 
1.4% and 5.3% respectively.  It is interesting to note that quality did not increase as much in the 
accession nations. However, since some of the EU nations actually did experience a reduction in 
quality while the accession nations did not, the smaller increase in quality is not likely to indicate 
a response to parallel trade competition. By the middle of the sample period, like the accession 
nations, the nations save Austria, Germany, Greece, and Ireland had higher levels of quality than 
in 1995.  
 
Even though the experience of Finland and Sweden does not seem to support the claim that PI 
competition reduces quality, it seems worthwhile to compare the quality of PI imports to the 
quality of non-PI imports. Using 405 non-PI consumer goods, the quality decomposition analysis 
is repeated for the accession countries.
13 Table 4 presents the results.  Non-PI imports did not 
exhibit exactly the same quality changes as PI goods.  For Sweden, in the first, third, and fifth 
periods, the quality of non-PI goods fell while PI quality rose. From 2000 to 2002 the reverse 
was true. In the remainder of the periods, both types of goods experienced quality changes in the 
same direction.  For Finland, non-PI goods had lower quality from 2000 to 2002 while PI goods 
had lower quality in the third, fifth, and eighth periods. In the last several periods, both nations 
had much lower volatility in the change in quality for non-PI goods than for quality changes in 
PI goods.  
 
4.  Conclusion 
This paper applies index number methodology for inferring the export quality of goods subject to 
PI competition.  When comparing the quality change in the two countries that became members 
of the EU in 1995 (Sweden and Finland) with the rest of the EU, there is not sufficient support 
for the claim that PI competition reduces quality. From a policy standpoint, this is encouraging 
because a tradeoff between lower prices from PI competition and a reduction in quality is not 
shown to exist in the EU.  
 
A logical extension to the analysis is to explore the change in quality for different types of 
products. The data can be broken down into categories like pharmaceuticals, clothing, and food.  
For goods like electronics, one might expect to see falling quality adjusted prices (due to lower 
production costs) and increasing quality. In addition, one could consider the quality of non-
consumer PI goods.  For example, farm implements have a substantial amount of dealer services 
(warranties, training) associated with them. If PI competition occurs with this type of product, 
reductions in quality may take the form of a reduction in services, not necessarily a reduction in 
quality of the tangible good itself.  
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Table 1: Change in the Observed Prices of Parallel Import Goods 
 
Change in Observed Prices 
   Period 
   95-96  96-97  97-98  98-99  99-00  00-01  01-02  02-03  03-04 
Finland  0.0492  0.1001  0.0197  0.0838  -0.0878  0.0284  0.1004  -0.0114  -0.0020 
Sweden  0.1596  -0.0731  0.0199  0.0184  0.1253  -0.0821  0.0337  -0.0077  0.0048 
Austria  -0.0974  0.0524  0.0488  0.0150  -0.0305  -0.0254  0.0213  -0.0775  -0.0994 
Belgium  0.0193  0.1714  0.0604  -0.0556  0.0450  0.2200  -0.0876  0.1307  -0.0432 
Denmark  0.1209  0.1337  -0.0019  0.2191  0.0696  0.0791  -0.0741  0.0921  0.0774 
France  0.0240  0.0304  0.0173  0.0684  -0.0251  0.0384  0.0498  -0.0350  -0.0049 
Germany  0.1668  -0.1141  -0.0219  -0.0357  -0.0116  0.0438  -0.0387  -0.0443  0.0698 
Greece  -0.0590  0.0523  -0.0585  -0.0180  -0.0304  -0.2320  0.0470  0.2802  -0.0128 
Ireland  -0.0180  -0.0424  0.0553  0.2533  0.1226  0.2834  -0.1940  -0.1029  0.1140 
Italy  0.0798  0.0303  -0.0241  0.0851  0.0432  0.0652  0.0662  0.0748  0.0446 
Netherlands  0.1156  0.1448  -0.0389  -0.0207  0.2439  0.1290  0.0452  -0.0119  -0.1390 
Portugal  0.0171  0.0511  0.1300  0.2882  0.0918  0.0638  0.0093  0.0287  0.0169 
Spain  0.0406  -0.0468  0.1582  0.0958  0.0384  -0.0156  0.0211  0.1317  0.1197 









Table 2: Change in the Quality-Adjusted Prices of Parallel Import Goods 
 
Change in Quality-Adjusted Prices 
   Period 
   95-96  96-97  97-98  98-99  99-00  00-01  01-02  02-03  03-04 
Finland  -0.0124  0.0420  0.0133  0.0462  0.0196  0.0142  0.0451  -0.0339  -0.0164 
Sweden  0.0764  -0.0193  0.0457  0.0281  0.0158  -0.0193  0.0367  0.0238  0.0876 
Austria  -0.0917  0.1122  0.0197  0.0460  0.0065  -0.0065  -0.0028  -0.1037  -0.0722 
Belgium  -0.0080  0.0423  0.0760  -0.0603  0.0679  0.0169  0.0085  0.1105  -0.0656 
Denmark  0.0158  0.1317  0.0426  0.0151  0.0307  0.0434  -0.0127  0.0019  0.0743 
France  0.0388  -0.0263  0.0281  -0.0444  0.0155  0.0673  0.0604  0.0301  -0.0209 
Germany  0.0006  0.0103  0.0096  0.0299  0.0292  0.0106  0.0696  -0.0424  0.0126 
Greece  -0.0488  0.0780  -0.0106  -0.0060  -0.0111  0.0242  0.0165  0.0187  -0.0597 
Ireland  0.0624  0.0204  0.0466  0.0951  0.0681  0.0269  -0.0170  -0.0151  0.0340 
Italy  0.0584  -0.0153  -0.0374  -0.0037  0.1127  0.0650  0.0458  0.0333  -0.0478 
Netherlands  -0.0004  0.0597  -0.0173  0.0101  0.0440  0.0784  0.0105  -0.1016  -0.0035 
Portugal  0.0024  0.0105  0.0310  -0.0047  0.0371  0.0170  0.0034  -0.0328  0.0161 
Spain  -0.0173  0.0359  0.0410  0.0331  0.0366  0.0059  0.0584  0.0130  -0.0109 
UK  0.0754  0.1045  -0.0447  0.0511  0.0634  -0.0001  0.0296  -0.0676  0.0363 
 
 
Table 3: Change in the Quality of Parallel Import Goods 
 
Change in Quality of Parallel Import Goods 
   Period 
   95-96  96-97  97-98  98-99  99-00  00-01  01-02  02-03  03-04 
Finland  0.0527  0.0491  -0.0026  0.0464  -0.0992  0.0739  0.0186  -0.2183  0.2042 
Sweden  0.0145  0.0340  0.0241  0.0032  0.1194  -0.0744  -0.1876  0.1308  -0.2514 
Austria  -0.0012  -0.0696  0.0256  -0.0358  -0.0357  -0.0097  0.0058  0.0458  -0.0308 
Belgium  0.0331  0.0314  -0.1749  0.2416  -0.0193  0.0768  -0.0453  0.0174  -0.0153 
Denmark  0.1374  -0.0395  -0.0170  0.2448  0.0806  -0.0912  -0.0858  0.0416  0.1929 
France  -0.0014  0.0573  0.0084  0.0956  -0.0109  -0.0607  0.0628  -0.0089  0.0234 
Germany  0.2015  -0.1066  -0.0598  -0.0462  -0.0578  0.0468  -0.0939  -0.0082  0.0986 
Greece  0.0048  -0.0572  -0.0016  -0.0136  -0.0302  -0.4293  0.1323  0.2861  0.0454 
Ireland  -0.0825  -0.0834  0.0003  0.1264  -0.0765  0.1752  0.2186  -0.0586  0.0521 
Italy  -0.0102  0.0744  0.0042  0.0566  -0.0746  -0.0162  0.0352  -0.0073  0.1364 
Netherlands  0.0651  0.0243  -0.0101  -0.0301  0.2205  0.0332  0.0700  0.1716  -0.4171 
Portugal  0.0403  0.0244  0.1078  0.2745  0.0475  0.0126  0.0144  0.0583  0.0615 
Spain  0.0670  -0.1128  0.0111  0.0664  -0.0080  -0.0132  -0.0206  0.0801  0.0728 






Table 4: Change in the Quality of Non-Parallel Import Goods: Finland and Sweden 
 
Change in Import Quality - non PI goods                   
   Period 
   95-96  96-97  97-98  98-99  99-00  00-01  01-02  02-03  03-04 
Finland  0.0358  0.0361  0.0089  0.0058  0.0724  -0.0187  -0.0310  0.0203  0.0283 
Sweden  -0.0416  0.0329  -0.0075  0.0854  -0.0030  0.0118  0.0265  0.0247  -0.0438 
 
 
 
 